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Foreword: Family Restructuring at the End of 
the Twentieth Century-Issues for a New 
Century 
Lynn D. Wardle* 
This issue of the B. Y. U. Journal of Public Law publishes a 
selection of the papers presented at the 1993 North American 
Regional Conference on Family Restructuring at the End of the 
Twentieth Century, convened by the International Society of 
Family Law (ISFL). The conference was held at Jackson Lake 
Lodge in the Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming, June 10-
12, 1993. 
As the chair of that conference, I have been invited to 
write an introduction to this issue. I do so in four parts. First, I 
describe the three-day regional conference. Second, I 
summarize the conference papers that have been selected for 
publication in this issue. Third, immediately after each 
abstract, I briefly comment on each paper, suggesting lines of 
further discussion and inquiry. (The purpose of such comments 
is not to criticize the articles, for each of them is excellent, but 
to expand consideration of the problems and analysis 
presented. In the familiar tradition of American legal 
education, I attempt to engage in a kind of Socratic dialogue to 
refine and enhance serious consideration of important subjects.) 
I also review and comment on four student pieces relating to 
family law that are published in this issue. I conclude with 
some reflective observations about the themes which emerged 
from these papers and the conference presentations that 
suggest the issues of family law and policy that will be of 
prevalent concern as the Twenty-first Century opens. 
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
1 
2 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
I. THE 1993 NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE ISFL 
The ISFV is well-known for its superb, scholarly world 
conference, held approximately every three years in different 
locations around the world.2 Those week-long gatherings 
attract hundreds of scholars in family law and other related 
disciplines from around the world. The multitude of different 
cultures, legal systems, and academic disciplines represented 
provides immensely valuable opportunities for formal and 
informal comparative discussions. Selected papers presented at 
such conferences have been published and are valuable 
reference sources.3 Because of the success of the world 
conferences, and the length of time between them, regional 
conferences have been convened in Mrica, Asia, and Western 
Europe. Yet the ISFL had never sponsored a regional gathering 
of family law scholars in North America before 1993. 
The members of the ISFL Executive Council from North 
America thought that a conference designed specifically for 
American and Canadian family law scholars would be 
extremely beneficial. 4 I was selected Chairman of the 
Conference and, with excellent support from the ISFL and 
1 The ISFL is an organization with more than 350 members in more than 
50 countries. 
2 The next (8th) world conference planned by the ISFL, dealing with the 
topic of Families Across Frontiers, will be held June 28-July 2, 1994 in Cardiff, 
Wales. For more information, contact Professor Nigel Lowe, 1994 ISFL Conference, 
Cardiff Law School, P.O. Box 427, Cardiff CF1 lXD, Wales, U.K. 
3 See, e.g., MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES: 
AREAS OF LEGAL, SOCIAL AND ETHICAL CHANGE: AN INTERNATIONAL AND 
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds., 1980); AN 
AGING WORLD, DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (John M. 
Eekelaar & David Pearl eds., 1989); PARENTHOOD IN MoDERN SOCIETY: LEGAL AND 
SOCIAL ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (John Eekelaar & Petar Sarcevic 
eds., 1993). 
4 Professor Sanford Katz of Boston College Law School, Professor Don 
MacDougall of the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, Professor Margo 
Melli of the University of Wisconsin Law School, and I, are members of the 
Executive Council of the ISFL, and together we functioned as the planning 
committee for the North America Regional Conference. 
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many of its distinguished members,5 we began planning a 
regional conference in the summer of 1991.6 
The culmination of the planning was the Jackson Lake 
Conference on Family Restructuring at the End of the 
Twentieth Century, attended by nearly a hundred family law 
professors, and a sprinkling of lawyers, scholars, and 
professionals in related disciplines including psychology, 
psychiatry, social work, and family studies. Most of the 
participants were from the United States (about 84 registrants) 
and Canada (about 12 registrants). However, other registrants 
came from as far away as Japan, Sweden, and Denmark. 
During the three-day conference, seventeen sessions 
(usually two or three sessions ran simultaneously) were 
conducted involving more than fifty scholarly presentations. 
Additionally, a general welcoming session, opening dinner, and 
conference luncheon provided opportunities for all participants 
to come together. Professor Anders Agell of the University of 
Uppsala, Sweden, President of the ISFL spoke at the luncheon. 
He drew on his extensive comparative and international 
experience to contrast legal policy, technique, and thinking 
concerning family law in civil and common law jurisdictions. 
The presenters were invited (though not required) to 
submit their papers for publication consideration. 
Approximately one-third did so, and from those papers, the 
articles included in this issue of the B. Y. U. Journal of Public 
Law were selected. Other papers were submitted to the 
International Journal of Law and the Family, published at 
Oxford University, some of which have been selected for 
publication there. The papers published here provide an 
excellent and representative sampling of the quality and scope 
of the conference presentations. 
5 In addition to the aforementioned members of the Executive Council, 
many family law scholars assisted with the planning and selection of the program. 
Space does not permit mentioning all of them, but Professor Carol Bruch, Professor 
Frances Olsen, Professor Harry Krause and Professor Carl Schneider were 
particularly generous with their time and suggestions. 
6 The key individual in the administration of the Conference was Lisa 
Stamps Jones, a law student at the B.Y.U. Law School who is simultaneously 
pursuing a graduate degree in educational administration. With her excellent 
administrative talents and her enthusiasm for planning and management (and with 
the gracious and cheerful support at the conference of her husband, Steve) the 
conference was a successful and memorable event. 
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II. BRIEF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF THE PAPERS 
Margaret Mahoney's contribution, A Legal Definition of 
the Stepfamily: The Example of Incest Regulation directly 
addresses the most prominent manifestation of "families in 
transition." Professor Mahoney, a leading contemporary 
authority on the law of stepfamilies in the United States,7 
notes that the traditional emphasis on the nuclear family 
prevents many persons who reside in other types of 
stepfamilies from enjoying the same type of recognition for 
their relationships. As stepfamilies account for nearly thirty 
percent of all married couple households with children in 
America, Professor Mahoney urges legal recognition of the 
parental rights and responsibilities of those relations. Since 
more than ninety percent of all stepparents are men, the issue 
of incest among steprelations is not insignificant. Yet in about 
one-third of all states, incest laws do not extend to 
steprelatives, and the prohibitions in other states vary 
profoundly. Relevant laws include both civil marriage 
prohibitions and criminal incest proscriptions. The Tennessee 
Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes v. McAfee,8 is faulted for 
not recognizing the long-term purported marriage of a 
stepdaughter to her stepfather for purposes of awarding the 
woman surviving spouse rights. Professor Mahoney calls for a 
comprehensive legal definition of stepfamily for the next 
century, as well as a sensitive policy analysis of how family 
laws should relate to steprelatives. 
The hybrid nature of step-relations certainly creates very 
thomy problems. Vacillation, if not inconsistency, seems 
inevitable. For example, criticizing the lack of uniform and 
equal treatment of stepfamilies and biological-nuclear families 
is not entirely consistent with applauding exceptions to the 
general application of family laws to stepfamilies. Likewise, 
criticism of the Tennessee Supreme Court decision in Rhodes,9 
for not recognizing (for purposes of surviving spouse rights) the 
7 See, e.g., Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the 
Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38 (1984); Margaret M. 
Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Federal Law, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (1987); 
Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 
22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917 (1989). 
8 457 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1970). 
9 ld. 
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marriage of a stepdaughter-stepfather reflects the ambivalence 
that has thwarted the development of the law regarding 
stepparent incest and marriage affinity prohibitions, and 
created the patchwork of inconsistencies that Professor 
Mahoney justly decries. Professor Mahoney's thorough research 
and multi-faceted analysis elucidates well the need for a 
comprehensive, systematic legal reform to harmonize the laws 
pertaining to stepfamily incest and marriage restrictions. 
Laurence C. Nolan's Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother: 
But Court-Ordered Grandparent Visitation in the Intact 
Family? criticizes the trend to statutorily authorize court-
ordered grandparent visitation over the objection of natural 
parents in intact families. Originally, grandparent visitation 
statutes applied only after the breakup of a family to prevent a 
vindictive custodial parent from terminating contact between 
the children of the divorce and the parents of the noncustodial 
spouse. The second generation of grandparent visitation 
statutes, however, allows courts to order parents in intact 
families to permit their parents (the grandparents) to visit 
their children (the grandchildren). 
Professor Nolan notes that grandparents' claims to 
visitation do not meet the constitutional test for fundamental 
rights" The policy underpinnings of the principle of family 
autonomy are carefully considered, and the value of state non-
interference are explained in terms of diversity, natural law, 
and practicality. The conflicting interests of grandparents, 
grandchildren, and the state are identified. Professor Nolan 
recommends the traditional standard for intervention in 
custody contests between parents and non-relatives: showing 
harm to the child from denial of visitation, and showing that 
visitation is in the best interests of the child (BIC). The BIC 
standard alone is not appropriate because grandparent 
interests do not cancel out parental interests like the interests 
of competing parents do. Grandparents have an appropriate 
avenue of access to grandchildren in intact families through 
their own children who are the grandchildren's parents, so 
state-ordered grandparent visitation in the absence of death, 
divorce, or separation, is unjustified. Equating grandparent 
visitation to noncustodial parent visitation is inapt. The stress 
of litigation and disruption of the forced visitation is 
detrimental to grandchildren, since sociological studies show 
that the most significant factor shaping the influence of 
grandparents on grandchildren is the grandparent's 
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relationship with the parent of the grandchildren. The 
importance of intact families for the proper development of 
children exceeds the importance of grandparent contact, 
especially when the latter comes at the cost of damaging the 
former. The fundamental constitutional right of parents to rear 
their children includes the right to determine who may visit 
with their children. A compelling justification to infringe this 
constitutional right exists when harm to the child can be 
shown, not merely when a child may be better off with 
grandparent visitation. Courts that look only for what is best 
for the child typically overlook the detrimental effects on the 
child of a court making such decisions. 
Professor Nolan makes a strong case for the need of 
greater protection to safeguard nuclear family relations from 
unwanted grandparent interference than the simple BIC 
standard provides. Her recommended two-step standard 
requiring first a showing of harm, might be reduced to one 
step; if the grandchild is harmed from denial of visitation, then 
it may be presumed that grandparent visitation is in the best 
interests of the child. But some might argue that denial of an 
association that is ''best" for a child is "harmful" to the child 
(compared to the achievable result). "Harm," like "best 
interests" is a pliable concept. Ultimately, the issue tums on 
some very practical questions: What is the standard of proof? 
How much harm must be proven to support a legal finding of 
harm? Likewise, resort to the doctrine of family autonomy 
requires consideration of the dysfunctional family-not divorced 
or separated, but not functioning as a real family in any 
meaningful way. Professor Nolan's thorough analytical 
dissection of the arguments for grandparent visitation with 
children in intact nuclear families is very impressive, and 
grounded in realism. 
Phyllis Bookspan's From a Tender Years Presumption to a 
Primary Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really 
Changed? . .. Should It? begins by reviewing the evolution of 
legal presumptions regarding child custody upon divorce. Then 
she argues that private decision-making about custody should 
be preferred, because parents, not judges or other professionals, 
know what is best for their children, and most families are able 
to make appropriate custody decisions without state 
intervention. Professor Bookspan suggests that a clear 
"determinative" legal rule should be adopted. She asserts that a 
"bright line" standard which tells the parties what result the 
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court is likely to reach if they do not privately settle the 
matter, encourages private ordering. Highly discretionary 
standards, such as "best interests of the child," and idealistic 
standards, like 'joint custody," are criticized as being 
impractical, unrealistic, and encouraging unnecessary 
litigation. The "primary caretaker" presumption is the best 
determinative standard because it is the most realistic, 
reflecting actual nurturing patterns and reasonable parental 
expectations. If it is gender-biased, that merely reflects the 
reality that substantially more mothers than fathers make the 
effort and devote the time to be the principal nurturer of their 
children. However, if the law too inflexibly adopts any 
definition of custody (such as "primary caretaker"), it will give 
the custodian absolute or near-absolute control. The preferred-
party then has no incentive to bargain to let the other parent 
have any custodial responsibility. Thus, reasonable contact 
with the noncustodial secondary caretaker should be expected. 
Professor Bookspan's analysis has the persuasive appeal of 
common sense. The problem, as she recognizes, is the 
uncertainty of vague rules regarding custody. Her arguments 
for a "determinative" custody rule are quite reasonable. The 
call for mandatory reasonableness in bargaining over visitation, 
however, seems to let the cat of uncertainty slip back in 
through an open window. Even a bright-line "determinative" 
rule regarding who gets custody will not solve the problem of 
uncertainty if the definition of "custody" is vague. Thus, a 
determinative rule for custody (like primary caretaker) should 
be complemented by a determinative rule regarding what 
custody entails, and a determinative definition of visitation 
rights. It is worth noting that there is a growing trend among 
both legislators10 and commentators11 to provide minimum or 
default visitation schedules or time periods, applicable in case 
the parties are unable to reach agreement between themselves 
as to what amount or routine of visitation is best for the 
children. However, if we combine a determinative rule 
regarding custody with a determinative rule defining visitation 
rights, have we not effectively undermined the prospects for 
parents to privately determine custody arrangements for their 
10 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-32 to -37 (Supp. 1993). 
11 See generally THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, PREL. DRAFT No. 3, § 7.15 
(1992). 
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children, which is the primary value the determinative rules 
seek to achieve? Professor Bookspan's rigorous analysis is an 
excellent step toward grappling with these tough issues. 
Allen M. Parkman, a Professor of Management, gives an 
economic analysis of the costs and consequences of the no-fault 
divorce revolution in Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the 
Marriage Contract. Negotiated termination of marriage under 
traditional divorce-for-fault grounds has been replaced by 
unilateral termination of marriage-at-will under no-fault laws, 
resulting in detrimental financial and quality-of-life 
consequences for divorced women and their children. In 
contract terms, marriage has changed from a contract for the 
joint lives of the parties with specific performance the remedy 
for breach, to a contract terminable at will, subject to 
liquidated damages prescribed by statute. Because women 
usually significantly alter their circumstances by family-
enhancing specialization, the change in marriage contract law 
leaves them particularly vulnerable. Marriage is a contract, 
and a fundamental function of contract law is to encourage 
long-term investments and to discourage opportunistic 
behavior. Contract remedies provide incentives for parties to 
make decisions that produce social benefits. The loss 
experienced by the spouse who has specialized in family-
enhancing skills is underestimated upon divorce. Employment 
and education for married women may not provide benefits to 
the family as much as it provides insurance for the married 
woman in case of divorce. Children in a divorce bear a heavy 
cost that goes uncompensated in the divorce damage 
calculation. The cost could be avoided in some cases if the law 
gave parents greater incentive to make marriage work. 
Professor Parkman proposes that a Marriage Code similar to 
the Uniform Commercial Code be drafted to encourage 
marriage duration for the joint lives of the parties, and with 
specific performance as the preferred remedy for breach of the 
marriage agreement. No-fault divorce should be permitted only 
when divorce costs are low, as when the divorce occurs early in 
marriage or before children are born. 
Professor Parkman's contract analysis cuts to the heart of 
the dilemma of no-fault divorce. No-fault has reduced the 
marriage contract from one of significant legal commitment and 
reciprocal reliability to one of individual convenience and 
instability. Some scholars call post-no-fault marriage contracts 
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"illusory."12 The focus on remedies is understandable as 
economic analysis must operate on quantifiable factors. The 
problem with economic analysis, as Professor Parkman hints, is 
the difficulty of accurately quantifying intangible family values, 
including "human capital" of family-skill specialization. 
Likewise, the social and personal value of intact families, of 
family continuity, and of full-time or significant nurturing of 
children by a parent may not be recognized by purely economic 
analysis any more than these intangibles are recognized in 
current "rights" analysis. For instance, economic analysis may 
recognize the potential financial benefit to individuals and their 
families when a married person substantially abandons 
caretaking responsibilities to pursue a lucrative but demanding 
career that leaves inadequate time and emotional resources for 
family responsibilities, but can it measure the potential 
intangible costs to the individual, the spouse, the children, the 
marriage, the parent-child relationships, the quality of family 
life, or to society (in terms of lost self-esteem, drug, sex and 
delinquency problems, etc.) of that step? Can it quantify the 
real cost of infidelity by a married man or woman-to self, 
spouse, children, marriage, or family? Economic analysis tends 
to undervalue and devalue non-economic goods, qualities, and 
conditions. Thus, drafting a Marriage Code modelled after the 
Uniform Commercial Code may perpetuate the devaluation of 
many intangible qualities that make marriage and family 
meaningful and desirable. Professor Parkman's excellent article 
invites us to examine these issues, and challenges us to take 
the contract dimension of marriage more seriously. 
Professor Cynthia Stames article, Stories of Dissociation 
and Buyout: Applications of a Contemporary Partnership Model 
for Divorce, also provides an economic-oriented analysis of 
divorce, comparing modern divorce to dissociation from a 
partnership. 13 Modem marriage ideology, the "egalitarian 
12 See, e.g., June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: 
Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L. REV. 953, 979 
n.l15 (1991); see also Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in 
Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 867-870, 882-898 (1988); William J. 
Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: 
The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 58-80 (1990). 
13 Professor Starnes' article elaborates on and refines an earlier publication. 
See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on 
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 67 (199.'3). 
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relationship," retains the entity concept ("one flesh") of the 
common law. But most marriages are not equal; the 
responsibilities of family "caretaking'' still are assumed largely 
by (and sometimes requiring full-time commitment of) women. 
As a result, the income-earning ability of married women 
suffers significantly. Borrowing from partnership dissociation, 
where the enterprise continues after a partner drops out, 
Professor Starnes proposes a "buyout" approach to achieve 
more equitable economic distribution upon the dissolution of 
marriage. Examples from traditional, hybrid, and egalitarian 
marriages are considered, and special exceptions to the buyout 
rule, which benefit the high-achieving caretaker and the 
childless caretaker who might get relatively little under a pure 
partnership buyout model, are suggested. 
Professor Starnes impressively unmasks the equality myth, 
i.e., the denial and devaluation of the real costs of "caretaking" 
services that are typically provided by married women for the 
benefit of their families. Her incisive discussion of the hidden 
costs of caretaking forces one to question other hidden aspects 
of the marriage partnership, such as the denial and 
devaluation of the real worth and value of these "caretaking" 
services. The partnership buyout analogy is helpful, but may be 
of limited practical value. In an era of late-marriage (or 
remarriage) patterns, as well as dual-income, diminished-
caretaking marriage patterns, one wonders whether buyout 
would provide significant protection to increasing numbers of 
women whose real investment in their husband's income-
producing enterprise may be demonstrably diminishing. 
Moreover, partnership dissociation and buyout are appropriate 
models only if the partnership enterprise continues despite one 
partner leaving it. Some fundamental assumptions of the 
application of partnership buyout to marriage termination may 
need to be examined. The justification for treating a marriage 
that ends in divorce as an "enterprise that continues," or of 
assuming that all "income-generating activity of the marriage" 
is the real "marital enterprise," or of computing the real value 
of the marital enterprise without considering how much the 
sole (or greater) income earner would be earning if she had not 
gotten married, or of requiring buyout payments to continue 
long into the future, in perpetuity (less like dissociation than 
silent partner or shareholder participation) is not self-evident. 
While questions such as these must be addressed, Professor 
Starnes excellent paper has convincingly shown that the 
1] FOREWORD 11 
partnership model is a promising legal analogy. Intuitively 
modem marriage is widely felt to be and experienced as a 
partnership or shared endeavor. 14 
In Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 
Professor Jane C. Murphy addresses the neglected practical 
problem of the delivery of legal services to the low- and 
moderate-income population. Family law services are the most 
frequently-requested type of legal assistance (thirty-two 
percent) sought by indigent persons in the United States, yet 
between one-half and four-fifths of those requests are not met. 
Almost one-half of all litigants in domestic cases are 
unrepresented; including ninety-three percent of defendants in 
child support cases. A realistic case study illustrates the severe 
practical dilemmas a middle-income family experiences 
regarding access to legal services upon divorce. As a significant 
increase in public funding for family law services is unlikely, 
Professor Murphy recommends adopting substantive rules 
(such as the primary caretaker rule in custody disputes) that 
make it easier for unrepresented parties to obtain fair legal 
consideration. She also recommends improving the procedures 
and structures (no hearings, summary proceedings, use of 
nonlawyer aides, increasing pro se programs) to fairly 
accommodate the situation of unrepresented parties. 
Professor Murphy offers a viewpoint of great potential 
value to the legal profession. Such mundane matters as court 
procedures, forms, filing regulations, location of tribunals, and 
method of proceeding may do more to provide or prevent justice 
than grand theoretical doctrines and impressive substantive 
reforms. Professor Murphy's article precipitates reconsideration 
of some basic issues. One might begin by noting that the 
financial barriers to legal services for low- and middle-income 
Americans affect all kinds of legal problems, not just family 
law problems. Why should family law be given priority or 
preference in facilitating access to the courts? Is it because 
family law problems are the type of problems for which our 
legal system functions best? Is it because parties who take 
family law problems to court are best satisfied with the results, 
and come away with the best impression of the value of our 
legal system? Is it because there are no other, certainly no 
better, places to obtain relief for family problems than lawyers 
14 See infra pp. 15-16. 
12 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
and courts, and no better solution for family problems than 
legal solutions? Will life in the United States really be better if 
we double or quadruple the amount of family litigation by 
indigent and moderate-income parties? Will their lives really be 
appreciably enhanced? Finally, one wonders whether the 
problems identified are limited to and the reforms suggested 
should be limited to low-income families, or whether the nature 
of family law disputes. does not suggest that they should be 
significantly de-formalized, if not de-legalized, regardless of the 
income of the parties. Professor Murphy's revealing empirical 
studies and realistic perspectives not only underscore the need 
for practical reforms, but raise some important questions about 
the epidemic of legalization of family relations. 
In Legal Policy, Technique and Research in Family Law: 
Some Comparative Aspects, Professor Anders Agell of the 
University of Uppsala, Sweden and President of the ISFL, 
contrasts the open, fairness-seeking objectives of the common 
law countries with the regulated, foreseeability-protecting 
objectives of civil law countries. He notes that differences in 
legal scholarship between American and civil law countries 
particularly reflect these technical differences. Coherence in 
legal policy is Professor Agell's preferred approach to 
comparative legal studies, and examples concerning the role of 
contract in family law, treatment of professional degrees, 
relationship between property division and alimony, and 
treatment of common law marriage and non-marital 
cohabitation are described. Professor Agell concludes by noting 
the value of comparative law for enhancing understanding of 
one's own national law. 
Comparative family law insights may be very revealing, as 
Professor Agell's irrefutable observations about the discretion-
protecting preference of common law jurisdictions and the 
predictability-protecting approach of civil law jurisdictions 
demonstrate. His emphasis on finding "coherence" in 
comparative legal studies reminds us that husbands and wives, 
parents and children are fundamentally alike in significant 
ways, regardless of where they live or the cultures from which 
they come. It could be added that differences and divergences 
in the family policies, techniques and scholarship of different 
countries are very revealing, too. In the laboratories of different 
legal systems different approaches function as social 
experiments that permit skilled comparative family law 
researchers to discern the advantages and disadvantages of 
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various potential solutions to ubiquitous problems of family law 
and social policy. 
Ill. BRIEF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF STUDENT 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
In addition to papers presented at the Jackson Lake 
Lodge conference, this issue of the B.Y.U. Journal of Public 
Law contains four students pieces addressing family-law-
related issues. In the Best Interest: The Adoption of F.H., An 
Indian Child by Ivy N. Voss, examines the dilemma of the 
adoption of Indian children by non-Indian adoptive parents 
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The case of In re 
Adoption of F.H./5 launches the study. F.H. was bom with 
symptoms of Fetal Alcohol Effects to a native Alaskan woman 
and an unknown man. She was in foster homes from birth, 
reared from age four-months by the Hartleys, who adopted her 
when she was two years old. Shortly thereafter they had to 
move from Alaska to Washington. Her mother voluntarily 
relinquished her parental rights so that the Hartleys could 
adopt F.H. The mother's native American village of Noatak 
opposed the adoption and proposed placement with a member 
of the extended family, but the trial court and Alaska Supreme 
Court found "good cause" for circumventing the ICWA statutory 
preferences for extended family and tribal placement. Ms. Voss 
gives a sympathetic review of the policy and purposes of the 
ICWA and summarizes some dilemmas of interpretation, 
including the definition of "Indian Child," tribal rights, 
exclusive tribal court jurisdiction, and placement preferences 
under the ICW A. Constitutional issues ranging from violation 
of state authority to regulate domestic relations to racial 
discrimination have not been entirely resolved. The Alaska 
Supreme Court interpretation of the ICWA, making the best 
interest of the child a "good cause" consideration, is lauded. 
The ICWA addresses one of the most fascinating and 
difficult issues in family law-the role of racial or cultural 
identity in custody or adoption placement decisions. The 
inconsistencies created in the effort of lawmakers and judges to 
balance competing considerations are apparent in both the 
ICWA and Ms. Voss' analysis of them. If the typical modern 
American view of what is ''best" for an Indian child is so 
15 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993). 
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different from what the typical (or a specific) Indian tribe or 
culture thinks is best for the child (on the basis of fundamental 
cultural disagreements on value questions for which there are 
no absolute rational standards), one wonders how asking 
typical American judges to apply the "best interest of the child" 
standard will help resolve the dilemma. On the other hand, one 
wonders about the rationality of giving tribes a veto power over 
an adoption decision made by Indian parents for the benefit of 
a child, when that decision is endorsed by independent social 
workers, and reviewed and approved by an impartial judge. 
Clearly a tribe is a political unit with a direct political interest 
in enhancing its political base and its legal power, regardless of 
the welfare of children. The power given the tribe seems 
directly inconsistent with the values underlying the Supreme 
Court's constitutional view of the relations of family, state and 
child. 16 Consideration of the policy foundations of the ICWA is 
certainly timely. 
Billye D. Baird examines one of the provocative issues of 
biomedical ethics and family law in Fetal Tissue Transplants as 
Treatment for Parkinsonian Patients: A Miracle Cure or Science 
Fiction Nightmare. Mter describing the etiology of Parkinson's 
Disease, Ms. Baird reviews the complicated political history of 
the moratorium on federally-funded research involving fetal 
tissue taken by induced abortion. The arguments for and 
against the moratorium are capably summarized and 
compared, and some internal inconsistencies in positions on 
both sides are noted. The political denouement of the 
controversy-President Clinton's executive order and approval 
of congressional legislation-are described. Ms. Baird concludes 
that the moral concerns about fetal tissue transplants 
encouraging abortion are significant and override the 
arguments for medical need and benefit which are very 
tenuous. 
The debate over the use of fetal tissue for medical research 
is a fascinating controversy in which political concerns seemed 
to dominate and rational analysis seemed to disappear. The 
argument that many women will be persuaded to have 
abortions they otherwise would not have is empirically 
unsupported and seems questionable. Roe v. Wade, 17 long ago, 
made abortion a matter of private choice, and surveys of the 
16 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-402 (1923). 
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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reasons why women have abortions consistently show that 
most women get abortions for personal or social, not 
therapeutic, reasons. 18 In an age when mere personal 
preference is deemed an acceptable reason for most of the 1.5 
million elective abortions annually, 19 the argument that a 
significant number of women will be persuaded to have an 
abortion because some person might receive some medical 
benefit as a result of the abortion may be strained. This review 
of the ethical considerations involved in the fetal tissue debate 
clarifies many of the serious dimensions of an issue that seems 
to have been trivialized by politicization. 
In Losing Sticks from the Bundle: The Incompatibility of 
Tenancy by the Entireties with Life and Legislation in the Late 
Twentieth Century, Barbara Sharp examines the protection for 
an innocent spouse when a forfeiture claim under the 
comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 
is made against property held as tenancy by the entireties. 
United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue,20 is the focus of the 
analysis. In that case the federal government sought forfeiture 
of the real property (site of a pharmacy) that was the locus of 
the illegal drug sales. The property was owned as a tenancy by 
the entireties by the convicted drug dealer and his wife. The 
district court dismissed the forfeiture complaint on the ground 
that such a tenancy cannot be severed by illegal activities. The 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, 
holding that the innocent wife of the drug dealer should have a 
life estate that would ripen into fee simple title should her 
husband predecease her. Ms. Sharp reviews the numerous 
18 Aida Torres & Jacqueline D. Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 170 (1988) (a 1987 survey of 1900 women who had sought 
abortions reported the following motivations: rape or incest, 1%; personal health 
problems, 7%; possible fetus health problems, 13% (although only 8% actually 
sought medical advice); problems with relationship or desire to avoid parenthood, 
51%; presently unable to afford a baby, 68%; concern about how baby would 
change life, 76%); Geraldine Faria, Ph.d. et a!., Women and Abortion: Attitudes, 
Social Networks, Decision-Making, 11 Soc. WORK HEALTH CARE 85, 90-92 (1985) (of 
517 women seeking abortion the following reasons were given: rape, 0.8%; fear of 
pregnancy, 1.2%; physical problems, 6%; no partner, 15.3%; financial problems, 
25.9%; lack of parental readiness, 33.5%). Utah statistics on the reasons for 
abortion from 1978-1990 reveal that over 98% of all abortions are performed for 
reasons of private choice or convenience (not rape, incest, fetal deformity, or 
maternal health). UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, INDUCED ABORTIONS IN UTAH 
(1978-1990 eds.). 
19 !d. 
20 949 F.2d 73 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
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authorities supporting the position taken by the district court, 
notes that the district court decision was consistent with state 
law principles that forbid a creditor or bankruptcy proceeding 
to disturb the tenancy by the entireties, and criticizes the 
Court of Appeals for creating a "new estate" less valuable to 
Mrs. Bernstein. Finally, calling for abolition of this type of 
property estate, Ms. Sharp criticizes the fictional unity of 
husband and wife that underlies tenancy by the entireties 
because it is outmoded, and it interferes with bankruptcy, 
creditors remedies, and drug foreclosures. 
Certainly most modern marriages do not reflect the belief 
that husband and wife are of one mind in all things. But 
mutuality is required in many important matters of marriage, 
including, for example, sexual relations, adoption, etc. Even in 
mundane financial matters, at the practical level, many 
marriages function on the basis of mutual agreement (e.g., 
where they will move to find or take employment, whether they 
will purchase a four-door sedan or two-door sports car, whether 
to buy a hide-a-bed or simple sofa, what color to paint the 
hallway, etc.). Criticism of tenancy by the entireties because 
the entity concept of marriage is outmoded in modern marriage 
ignores the fact that tenancy by the entireties is voluntarily 
chosen by many married couples. That raises at least the 
possibility that when it comes to home ownership-the most 
valuable (often the only significant) asset many married 
couples have-the concept of a unified marital entity is actually 
appealing to some modern married couples who want such a 
major investment to be possessed and controlled on a joint-and-
mutual basis, with right of survivorship in the spouse. The fact 
that merchants, bankruptcy creditors, and police agencies may 
be somewhat hampered in their efforts to dispossess married 
couples from their homes seems hardly a compelling reason to 
abolish an estate that has protected the financial and lodging 
security of married couples and families for centuries. This 
paper raises good questions about real property estates and 
family arrangements that merit further careful consideration. 
Prosecution of Child Abuse on Federal Lands: A Hole in the 
Wall by F. Chris Austin considers the gaps in federal 
legislation addressing the problem of child abuse on federal 
lands in general, on Indian lands in particular. Mr. Austin 
reviews some of the major federal laws designed to motivate 
and facilitate local (state and tribal) child abuse prevention and 
prosecution, noting that this type of federal child abuse 
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legislation is relatively well-developed. He also reviews federal 
laws directly prohibiting or authorizing prosecution of child 
abuse on federal land, which have focused on child sexual 
abuse and often overlooked physical abuse and neglect. There 
is no federal law prohibiting nonsexual child abuse on federal 
land. Such acts must be prosecuted under state law under the 
Assimilative Crimes Act,21 which does not apply to offense in 
Indian country, or must be prosecuted under general assault 
provisions of the federal criminal code, which are not made for 
child abuse prosecution. Mr. Austin proposes three possible 
federal legislative remedies. 
The problem of child abuse prevention and punishment has 
not been ignored by either the states or by the federal 
government. Child abuse legislation has been one of the 
"growth areas" of family in both state and federal law for two 
decades. Unfortunately, the abuse of children is one of the ugly 
byproducts of the breakdown of the family and the evisceration 
of other mediating institutions-the communities that foster 
and enforce values, such as neighborhood, extended family, 
church and ethnic community (including tribe). Ironically, 
proposals to increase direct federal responsibility for solving 
the problem only exacerbate this problem. Strengthening the 
initiative of the federal government, remote from the influence 
that cause child abuse, has the effect of weakening the 
communities that are closest to the source of the problem and 
best situated to deal effectively with it. This short piece does 
not consider the dilemma of different cultural definitions of 
abuse and neglect (a major concern underlying the enactment 
of the Indian Child Welfare Act). 22 It raises serious issues of 
federalism and cultural diversity. Mr. Austin's report reminds 
us that there are some huge gaps in the national system of 
child abuse punishment laws. 
IV. CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FAMILY LAW ISSUES 
THAT WILL GREET THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
As the papers published herein demonstrate, a wide 
variety of issues, policies and problems were addressed at the 
North American Regional Conference. But common points can 
be discerned. First and foremost, the desire for fairness in the 
21 18 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1!:JHH). 
22 25 U.S.C. § 1!:!01 (1!:188). 
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law is an overriding concern. Virtually every reform proposal 
and analysis of policy issues explicitly or implicitly, raised 
fairness as an underlying consideration. Second, changing 
social circumstances were noted in all of the papers. Living in 
an age of constant and rapid change clearly is felt and reflected 
by these scholars. Third, the value of families and family 
relations is either expressed or assumed in all of these papers. 
Despite the profound social changes that have occurred and are 
occurring, it appears that the family is, in the words of Mary Jo 
Bane, "here to stay."23 Fourth, a desire for greater legal 
protection of family relations, particularly for those who are 
dependent upon and who invest heavily to benefit the family, is 
a prominent theme of these papers, as it was throughout the 
conference. 
One other theme was suggested more by its absence than 
by its presence in the papers presented herein, and at the 
North American Regional Conference generally. It appears that 
conflict-theory ideology and dogmatic, gender-interest-driven 
analysis are abating among serious family law scholars. 
Gender-based concerns in family law are neither novel nor 
insignificant; the connections between gender and family role 
are too long-established and well-documented by too many 
disciplines to be ignored or dismissed.24 However, the narrow 
advocacy of gender-preferences in legal policy, puts a type of 
special class-preference above principle, and raises serious 
concerns about fundamental values of individual rights, equal 
justice, family integrity, and the rule of law.25 Likewise, 
conflict-based theories of family relations may describe the 
dynamics of some forms of family dysfunction and deviance, but 
by ignoring the historical experience of functional families they 
present a distorted model of family life on which to base laws 
and policies. Many modern conflict- and gender-viewpoint 
approaches have been myopically reductionist, diminishing 
families, family relations, law, and policy not merely to the 
23 MARY J. BANE, HERE TO STAY: AMERICAN FAMIUES IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
(1976). 
24 See Julio C. Caycedo et al., Gernler Roles in the Famil:~, in 1 FAMILY 
RESEARCH: A SIXTY-YEAR REVIEW, 1930-1990, at 435-491 (Stephen J. Bahr ed., 
1991). 
25 "The too familiar vice of the present age is to obtrude as manifest truths, 
mere fancies, born of conjecture and superficial reasoning, altogether unsupported 
by the testimony of sense." William Harvey, quoted in DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE 
DISCOVERERS 367 (1983). 
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sum of the parts (male and female, parent and child) but 
centrifugally casting them into adversary male-versus-female, 
and parent-versus-child conflict alignments. If the sad 
experience of many individuals with family dysfunction and 
family breakup proves it is necessary for the law to recognize 
the potential for, and address the flare-ups of such conflicts, to 
let that vision of the family dominate public policy and 
scholarship makes no more sense than to adopt triage or 
emergency room medical services as the model for all medical 
services. The presentations at the North American Regional 
Conference, as represented by the papers published here, 
demonstrate that serious family law scholars now generally 
value analysis of family law issues from more balanced and 
complete perspectives. 
Thus, there appears to be a consensus among North 
American family law scholars that these five thematic concerns 
dominate the analysis of family law and policy at the end of the 
Twentieth Century. The opening of the Twenty-first Century 
will probably find family law scholars searching for ways to 
empower appropriate discretion in family dispute resolution, to 
cope with changing social values and family arrangements, to 
recognize the hidden value of families and family relations, to 
protect those who depend upon and sacrifice to promote the 
welfare of individual family units, and to analyze family law 
issues from perspectives that go beyond narrow conflict-based 
theories or rigidly ideological gender-preference advocacy. 
